This paper extends Jones and Olken (2005) to study the role of subnational leaders in economic growth using city-leader pair data collected from China's 17 provinces for the period 1994-2008. With a significant number of leaders working in more than one city in their observed careers, our data allow us to compare leaders across cities and improve on Jones and Olken's test. Our further exploration shows that our sample does not suffer from biased attrition and our results are not affected by nonrandom moves of leaders. Using the leaders' personal abilities estimated from our test, we find that more capable leaders focus more on the growth of the secondary sector than on the primary and tertiary sectors. In addition, we obtain finer results than Li and Zhou (2005)'s for the promotion in the Chinese political hierarchy. We find that personal ability is a better predictor than economic growth and personal ability significantly increases a person's chances of promotion if he is younger than 50 years old.
Introduction
Jones and Olken (2005) provide a seminal study on the role of national leaders in determining economic growth. This paper extends that study by studying subnational leaders using data collected on cities from 17 Chinese provinces for the period 1994-2008. While a study of subnational leaders can be interesting in itself, we contend that our contribution is more related to a methodological improvement to Jones and Olken's test.
The most significant advantage of our dataset is that it contains a large number of leaders who served in more than one city. This enables us to construct a large "connected" subsample of cities that had leaders moving among them. With this subsample, we are able to separate leaders' personal effects from the city fixed effects and compare leaders across cities. Here the move of leaders across geographic borders is critical to identify their personal effects. Unlike in 1 a two-way fixed-effect model where the two sets of fixed effects are usually orthogonal to each other, we are dealing with a three-way fixed-effect model where the leaders' personal effects and the city fixed effects share the same dimension while they are both orthogonal to time.
As a result, the leaders' personal effects cannot be separated from the city fixed effects if no leader moves between cities. Jones and Olken study national leaders who do not move from one country to another, so they are not able to compare leaders across borders. Our improvement thus is of two folds.
First, to the extent that they only compare leaders within the same country, Jones and Olken provide a test with limited information. With leaders' personal effects estimated and comparable across cities, our test uses more information than Jones and Olken's. As a result, our test is less likely than their test to make the second type of error.
Second, in Jones and Olken's test leaders' performances are assumed to follow the same distribution. Because countries have quite different institutional settings, the test may be subject to the problem of heteroscedasticity although country fixed effects are controlled. Our test does not rely on any assumption on how leaders' personal effects are distributed; instead we directly estimate those effects. This implies that we allow for heterogeneous treatment effects across leaders. From this perspective, our test is more general than Jones and Olken's.
At the substance level, though, our test is not as general as Jones and Olken's. In particular, we are not aimed at contributing to the determinism-Great Man debate, primarily because subnational leaders are not qualified to make Great Man-type decisions.
The challenges we face is to deal with endogenous composition of our sample and endogenous switches of leaders. Like Jones and Olken's test, our test also relies on detecting the variation among leaders. If the entry and attrition of leaders in our sample follow particular patterns -e.g., stronger leaders are more likely to appear in more recent years, and weaker leaders tend to be more likely to leave the sample -then the variation among leaders can be systematically altered. In the same vein, the variation among leaders may also be inflated or deflated if leaders follow a systematic pattern to switch from one city to another. Jones and Olken only compare leaders within the same country, but still face the issues of endogenous sample composition and switches. They deal with the switch issue by a novel approach of using the sudden death of a leader to ensure an exogenous switch, and deal with the sample composition issue by limiting the comparison within a relative short period of time before and after a leader's sudden death. The approach we adopt is to follow the labor economists studying employee-firm matched data to conduct various tests to ensure that entry and attrition are sufficiently random and endogenous switches do not seriously impede our test.
In addition to extending the Jones and Olken test, our study also makes two improvements to Li and Zhou (2005) 's study on the relationship between leader performance and promotion in China. First, we study city leaders while Li and Zhou study provincial leaders. There 2 are more observations in our dataset so potentially we can provide more reliable results. In addition, the promotion of provincial leaders to the central government is often influenced by political factors whereas the promotion of city leaders to the provincial offices is less likely so.
As a result, our study may provide a clearer identification for the relationship between leader performance and promotion. Second, Li and Zhou use the average growth rate of a leader's tenure years to predict his promotion. Although they have controlled provincial fixed effects, the growth rate may not entirely reflect a leader's own capabilities which presumably are the factor the organizational department looks at. We directly use the estimated leaders' personal effects to predict their promotion so we provide a finer test for the relationship between leader performance and promotion.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a description of the sources and structure of the data. Section 3 deals with the methodological issues. First, it describes the problem of indeterminacy in high-dimensional matched data and the econometric approach we apply. Second, it discusses how endogenous sample composition and endogenous switches of leaders would affect our test results. Section 4 presents our main test and performs additional tests on sample composition and endogenous switches to make sure that they do not impede our main test. In addition, we also carry out a study on the heterogeneous effects of leaders' personal abilities on the growth of different sectors. Section 5 analyzes the relationship between leaders' personal abilities and their promotion. Section 6 concludes the paper.
The Data
China has a decentralized fiscal system despite its one-party political system (Che, Qian, and Weingast, 2005). There are five levels of government in the country: the central, provincial, city, county/district, and township. Each level of government has its own independent taxes and budgets. In this paper, we study city-level leaders. There are a total of 333 cities in the country. In each city, two posts are regarded as the most important. One is the secretary of the communist party, and the other is the mayor. We study both of them.
The period covered by our study is 1994-2008. This period was chosen primarily because of the availability of data. It is difficult to get data on city leaders before 1994, and data beyond 2008 were not made public when the major body of data was collected. The year 1994 was chosen as the starting year also because China started a new revenue-sharing system in that year. Before that year, the central government shared revenue with provincial governments based on negotiation; since that year, revenue has been shared under a set of rules governing the administration of taxes, similar to the system adopted in the United States.
Information of the party secretaries and mayors was collected from The China Yearbook of Municipalities, provincial yearbooks and reports from the mass media. We then match the leaders to annual macroeconomic data collected from provincial yearbooks by the following rule 1 :
1. Each city-year observation is matched with one secretary and one mayor.
2. If there was a turnover within a year, we take the leader who stayed for over 6 months in that year.
3. If there were multiple turnovers in a year and no leader stayed for over 6 months, we take the leader with the longest stay in that year.
Due to the limitation of data sources, we were only able to collect complete name list for 1586 leaders in 229 cities of 17 provinces for the whole period 1994 to 2008. For more detailed personal information such as age, previous experience, and promotion, we were only able to get data for the period 2001 to 2008. We will call the 15-year sample "the long sample", and the 8-year sample "the short sample" henceforth. Table A1 in the appendix lists the name of cities in our dataset. Among all the 1586 leaders in the long sample, 1354 served in only 1 city, 207 had one switch, 21 had two switches, and four had three switches (Table A2) . We call those who served in more than one city in our sample period "the movers". The total number of movers was 232, or about 15% of the total number of leaders. The average tenure of a position was 3.5 years, lower than the designated tenure of five years, also lower than the average tenure of the provincial leaders during the period 1978-2005 which was almost four years (Wang and Xu, 2008 ). The median tenure was even shorter, barely above two years.
In a dataset like ours, attrition is unavoidable. Table A3 presents the distribution of the number of years a leader appears in our sample. Half of them appear for less than three years while only one quarter appear for more than five years. There are generally three ways for a leader to leave our sample: promotion to the provincial or central government, being moved to a city not covered by our sample, and retirement. We define promotion in the following way:
• From an ordinary city to a provincial capital or a city with equivalent status.
• From any city to provincial government as party secretary, governor, vice secretary or vice governor.
• From an ordinary city to the head of a department in the provincial government. Using the short sample, we can get a sense of the distribution of attrition. Among the 986 leader-term pairs in the short sample, 424 of them ended with the leaders' getting promoted while 178 ended with retirement. While the determination of each of these three ways of attrition is not likely to be random, what is pertinent to our study is whether the group of attrition as a whole is systematically different from the group staying in our sample. If it is not, then attrition can be treated as random draws from the existing sample.
The Econometric Specification and Identification
The econometric model we use is a three-way fixed-effect model:
where y ijt is the per capita GDP growth rate of city j in year t under leader i's tenure, X ijt is a set of time-varying controls, θ i is leader i's personal (fixed) effect, ψ j is city j's fixed effect, γ t is the fixed effect for year t, and ϵ ijt is the random disturbance. In X ijt we include per capita GDP and population of city j in the starting year of leader i's tenure. This makes equation
(1) a revised version of the regular growth equation.
Identification
In most panel-data analysis, researchers focus on the coefficients of covariates and add fixed effects only as controls to eliminate unobservable within-group-invariant factors. In this paper, we care about the fixed effects themselves. However, we have three sets of fixed effects to estimate while the data of economic performance only have two dimensions, i.e., city-leader pair and the calendar year, so there is indeterminacy between the city and leader fixed effects. to stress the indeterminacy in two aspects. First, not all leader and city fixed effects can be identified; only those leaders and cities "connected" by leaders switching between cities can be identified. Second, even within a connected group, only the difference of the leader or city fixed effects is meaningful while their magnitudes can be arbitrary. Figure 3 provides a simple illustration. In the figure there are three cities and six leaders.
Leaders 1 and 2 only served in city A, leader 3 served in both city A and city B, leader 4 only served in city B, and leaders 5 and 6 only served in city C. City 1 and city 2 are connected by leader 3 who served both cities. Because of that, all the four leaders having served in the two cities are also connected. We then call cities A and B and leaders 1 to 4 a connected group.
In contrast, city C has not a leader switching to the other two cities, nor does it have a leader coming from the other two cities. So city C and leaders 5 and 6 form a separate group.
[ Figure 3 inserted here.]
Because cities and leaders share the same dimension in the space determining economic performance, normally we can only identify the sum of the leader fixed effect and the city fixed
As a result, the fixed effect of city C ψ C cannot be separated from the fixed effects of leaders 5 and 6, θ 5 and θ 6 . So ψ C cannot be identified. However, the difference of θ 5 and θ 6 can be identified because it is equal to ω 6,C − ω 5,C .
In the connected group, we can do more using the connection created by the "switcher" In conclusion, we can identify the differences of fixed effects between leaders as well as between cities within a connected group and can identify the differences of fixed effects between leaders having served in the same city. In this sense, moving local officials from city to city increases the size of the connected group, which makes it feasible to compare personal qualities within a larger amount of cities. As long as there is one switcher during the sample period, we can compare the fixed effects between the cities as well as between all leaders who served in those cities, even if they did not move at all. This may be a key reason why the central government in China keeps moving officials across cities and provinces.
In our long sample of 1586 leaders, 232 stayed in at least two cities and the remaining 1354 appeared in only one city. This results in 20 connected groups and 24 isolated cities and 167 isolated leaders. Table A4 provides detail information on the groups. As one can see, among the connected groups, many groups are small. But group 5 is sufficiently large for our analytical purpose. This group consists of 75 cities, 489 leaders (among which 91 are switchers) and 1966 leader-city pairs (observations); that is, it accounts for about one third of the sample.
Thereafter we will confine our analysis to this group and simply call it "the connected sample".
Based on the connected sample, we can estimate equation (1) To see how our test would differ from that in Jones and Olken (2005), we also compose a similar χ 2 -test using only within-city variations. Our data have multiple turnovers of leaders in a single city and the average term length is only 3.5 years so the P RE and P OST in their paper are not clearly defined in our case. But consider a city A with 3 consecutive leaders with fixed effects θ 1,A , θ 2,A and θ 3,A . In the first turnover, P OST − P RE = θ 2,A − θ 1,A ; while in the second turnover, P OST − P RE = θ 3,A − θ 2,A . So the parallel test is θ 2,A = θ 1,A and θ 3,A = θ 2,A , which are merely θ i,A = 0 for all i since the mean of θ i 's can be set to zero.
In practice, we can estimate equation (1) using the long sample and then conduct the following test. First, denoteθ j as the average leader personal effect in city j and ϕ i,j = θ i −θ j as leader i's relative personal effect in city j. Note that ϕ i,j can be also calculated by demeaning ω i,j within cities. We then execute a χ 2 -test with H ′ 0 : ϕ i,j = 0 for all i and j. If we reject the null, then we can conclude that leaders differ even within a city, as did by Jones and Olken; if we reject the null, then we conclude that leaders do not outperform each other within a city.
Sample Composition and Endogenous Switches
Our test can be hampered by two kinds of issues involving our sample. One is nonrandom entries and attritions, which affect the composition of our sample; and the other is endogenous switches of leaders already in our sample. Both would bias our estimates of the leaders' personal effects.
The entry of leaders becomes an issue if it changes the composition of our sample. This is 7 particularly important if there exists a cohort effect. For example, if more recent leaders were more capable than their predecessors, then the variation in our sample increases. However, this issue is lessened when one realizes that leaders' capabilities should be factored in when the question is asked whether leaders matter. Nevertheless, we will check whether there are significant cohort effects in the estimated leaders' personal effects.
Nonrandom attrition can be a more serious issue for us. However, because attrition involves three exits, i.e., retirement, moving to a city not covered by our sample, and promotion, that are unlikely to require the same level of leaders' personal abilities, nonrandom attrition may not be a serious issue in our sample since most leaders finally leave the sample as time goes by while the rest are subjected to right censoring in the year 2008. But we will conduct a test that checks the correlation between attrition and the residual from equation (1) to further legitimize our analysis.
Following the labor economics literature (e.g., Abowd et al., 1999), we need to be concerned about endogenous switches of leaders from one city to another in addition to the conventional orthogonal condition. While endogenous switches can take many forms, we are more worried about those that inflate or deflate the variation among the leaders because the variation is the key to our test. In this case, the complementarity effect is the form of endogeneity that we need to pay more attention.
The complementarity effect arises when the match between leaders and cities enhances or reduces leaders' personal abilities. Our test relies on detecting the variation among leaders, but the complementarity effect may inflate or deflate the variation. There are several cases in which this effect can do that. First, an originally mediocre leader may improve his ability when he is placed in a city with significant challenges. For example, a leader in an already prosperous city may only show average ability, but when he is moved to a less prosperous city, he may register a remarkable performance record. Second, experience in certain types of city can enhance a leader's ability, so when he is moved to another city, he performs better than the average leader. For example, experience in a more open city may enhance a leader's ability to boost international trade, so when he is moved to a less open city, that city begins to export more. In both cases, the variation among leaders is enlarged due to the complementarity effect.
Then third, it is intuitive to understand that reverse movements of case 1 and case 2 can deflate the variation among the leaders.
We adopt a two-step strategy to address the complementarity issue. In the first step, we compare the personal effects of movers and non-movers. If we find that switches do not affect leaders' abilities, we then can conclude that movers and non-movers are not different at the mean. However, there is still a possibility that moves increase or reduce leaders' abilities. For example, if moves tend to increase the abilities of leaders who are initially mediocre, then those leaders' abilities will be brought closer to the sample mean. Therefore, we need to find out 8 whether switches have any intra-personal effect. This leads us to estimate a variant of equation (1) in our second step of test:
where move i is a dummy variable indicating the years a mover served beyond his first city;
that is, it is the subset of the personal dummy excluding a mover's tenure in his first city.
As a result, θ i is the personal effect of leader i when serving for the first city and α i is the added value of switches. Notice that we can only estimate α i for movers. An F-test of the joint significance of α i for them provides a decisive conclusion on whether switches affect the distribution of leaders' personal effects.
Leaders and Economic Growth: Empirical Results

The χ 2 Test
We first conduct the χ 2 test, the equivalent of the Jones and Olken test in our paper. We perform the test by estimating equation (1) 
The F-Test
We conduct the F-test by estimating equation (1) using the connected long sample of 489 leaders and a total of 1966 leader-city pair observations. In the regression, per capita GDP is measured in nominal yuan; its growth rate is also nominal measured in fraction. The year dummies can absorb the price effect. Population is measured in million. Following the solution in Cornelissen (2008), we impose the following zero-mean constraint in our estimation
By imposing this constraint, it is straightforward to apply the standard F-test that θ i are all zero. The resulted F-static is F(489, 1387)=1.81, and the p-value is smaller than 0.001. That is, the null hypothesis that leaders do not matter is rejected with a large margin. As for the estimates for per capita GDP and population, both return negative coefficients that are not statistically significant.
The role of leaders can also be shown by an analysis of variance. Table 1 shows the share of variance of per-capita GDP growth that the city, year, and personal dummies respectively explain for the connected sample. The city dummies alone explain only 7% of the total variation, the year dummies explain almost 50%, and the personal dummies explain 18%. Since the GDP data are in nominal terms, the year effects include the contribution of inflation. The average inflation rate was 4.6% between 1994 and 2008, accounting for 30% of the average nominal growth rate of per capita GDP in the sample. Taking this factor into consideration and comparing the contribution of the leaders to the contribution of cities, we can conclude that leaders play an important role in local economic growth.
[ Table 1 inserted here.] Figure 4 then shows a kernel density estimation of the distribution of the estimated individual leader effects in the connected group. Table 2 provides summary statistics of the distribution. The standard deviation is relatively small and the kurtosis is large, but the distribution is skewed left, indicating that there is a group of leaders with relatively low personal abilities.
[ Figure 4 and 
Tests of Sample Composition and Endogenous Switches
We first explore whether there are significant cohort effects among the estimated leader effects. Figure 5 shows the average personal effect of leaders entering our sample in the same year during the period 1995-2008. 2 Leaders entering in the earlier years and later years have higher estimated abilities than those entering in the years in between. While more research is needed to explain this pattern, the relevant message coming out of the figure is that there is not a linear trend so the entry is still more or less random for the study period as a whole.
[ Figure 5 inserted here.]
To check the randomness of attrition, we compose a dummy dropout it indicating leader i leaves the sample in year t. We check the correlation between dropout it and the residual from equation (1) ϵ it and find that the correlation coefficient is -0.114 with a standard error of 0.16.
That is, attrition is orthogonal to the error term.
Following our two-step strategy to check endogenous switches, we first see if movers are significantly different from non-movers. For that, we regress the estimated leader effects on a dummy indicating movers and a constant. This returns a coefficient for the dummy of 0.0056 with a standard error of 0.0105. So movers and non-movers are not different at the mean. We also regress the residual produced by equation (1) on the mover dummy and do not find that the dummy has any predictive power for the residual. That is, switches are orthogonal to the 2 The year 1994 is subjected to left censoring so its data are not shown.
error term. Finally, we estimate equation (2) and conduct an F-test for the joint significance of α i for the movers, which returns F(91,1351)=0.74 and a p-value of 0.97. Therefore, we conclude that switches do not affect the distribution of leaders' personal effects.
With those test results, we are confident that endogenous sample composition and endogenous switches do not affect our main result. The randomness of entry and attrition could be a result of the relatively large size of our connected sample. The randomness of switches could be related to the purpose that the central/provincial authorities have in mind when they move city leaders from one city to another. As we showed in Section 2, the leaders in our sample had a very short tenure in each city. The downside of a short tenure is obvious: it encourages leaders' short-sighted behavior. One of the explanations is that short tenures are used to prevent leaders from forging personal networks for corruption and accumulation of political power.
If that is the case, it is better for the central/provincial authorities to randomly shuffle city leaders. Another explanation is related to promotion. The central/provincial authorities want to promote leaders with higher personal abilities. But they have to face the same challenge that we face to identify leaders' personal effects. Shuffling leaders among cities thus can be a strategy for them to identify city leaders' true abilities, just like how we conduct our identification using the connected sample. With this in mind, one realizes that even a random shuffling is sufficient to allow the central/provincial authorities to conduct a complete comparison of city leaders serving in the "connected" cities.
Sectoral Effects
As a final note on the role of leaders on local economic growth, we study their heterogeneous effects across the primary, secondary and tertiary sectors. In the literature (e.g., Xu et al.,
2007), a switch of provincial leaders is found to be associated with different rates of sectoral growth; the secondary sector seems to benefit more. The secondary sector accounts for about half of the Chinese economy; its share is even higher in localities that are more open to international trade and thus are experiencing faster rates of economic growth. In addition, businesses in the secondary sector are more mobile than those in the other two sectors, so local leaders have to spend more efforts competing with each other in this sector.
Because the estimated leaders' personal effects are relative measures of their personal abilities, we transform them into ranks (called "leader ranking" thereafter) in the interval [0, 1] to facilitate the interpretation of results. Table 3 reports two sets of results. Regressions
(1)-(3) study the growth rates of the three sectors, and regressions (4)-(6) study their shares in the local GDP. It is clear that the leader ranking has a larger effect on the growth of the secondary sector than on the other two sectors, and in accordance, it increases the share of the secondary sector and reduces the shares of the other two sectors.
[ Table 3 here]
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5 Personal Abilities and Promotion Li and Zhou (2005) find that the average GDP growth rate of a provincial leader's tenure is a good predictor of his probability of promotion and retirement. However, Wang and Xu (2008) provide opposite evidence. They find that provincial party secretaries and governors who are later promoted to the central government do not significantly outperform others; the provincial leaders who come from and then go back to the central government even underperform the average. There may be two factors driving the controversial results. One is that the GDP growth rate may not be a good indicator for a leader's personal ability because it is highly correlated with local conditions, some of which change over time and cannot be accounted for by the provincial fixed effect. Another factor is that political considerations play a significant Because our estimation of the leaders' personal effects uses all their terms appearing in our sample, a natural approach seems to be estimating their probabilities of promotion when they leave our sample. But that turns out to be an incorrect approach. To understand this, take for the example a leader who served in both Taizhou and Suzhou of Jiangsu province in our sample period and left our sample by getting promoted to the province after his services in Suzhou. If we study his probability of promotion at the point when he left our sample, we will then not be able to tell whether his promotion was due to his experience in Taizhou or in Suzhou while apparently having served in Suzhou -a much bigger city than Taizhou -was a big plus for him. That is, conditional on a leader's personal ability, the city he has served for affects his probability of promotion.
Alternatively, we can estimate a leader's probability of promotion when he left a city.
This will allow us to control the city fixed effects. However, this approach may suffer from the problem of endogenous termination of a leader's tenure in a specific city. In the end, we estimate a leader's probability of promotion in each year using a linear probability model. This is also what Li and Zhou (2005) does.
We pointed out that there are three options for a leader to leave our sample: promotion, retirement, and moving to another city or other equivalent position not covered by our sample.
In terms of career advancement, the last option is the same as staying in the same city. So we conduct two kinds of comparisons in our estimation: one compares promoted leaders with all the rest staying in the running sample, and the other compares promoted leaders with non-retirees. When a leader approaches the age of 60, the chances of promotion diminishes quickly even if he is capable. So including them in the comparison may cause a downward bias on the estimate of personal ability. However, since we also define moving to a non-executive job also as retirement, deleting all the retirees also force us to compare those promoted with a younger comparison group. To the extent that younger leaders have the age advantage to get promoted, our estimates may also be biased downward if we delete the retirees. The net outcome depends on which effect is stronger.
In addition to the leader ranking, we control the following variables: age, years since first becoming a city leader (city experience in Table 4 ), and a dummy variable indicating whether a leader worked in the provincial government or not (provincial experience in Table 4 ). Age could be the most important factor in addition to ability determining a leader's chances of promotion because the promotion tournament constantly eliminates people so being young can be a big advantage when one wants to move upward in the bureaucratic hierarchy. For the same reason, it is natural to expect that starting more early as a city leader helps a person to get promoted. Lastly, having worked in the provincial government should increase a person's chances of getting promoted if political connection is important. However, it could also be the case that coming down from the provincial government to work in a city is a kind of exile for a person because it means that he cannot get promoted in the provincial government.
[ Table 4 here] Table 4 presents the results of five regressions. Regression (1) simply includes all the variables as they stand alone. It turns out that a leader's ranking of ability does not have a significant effect on promotion; in fact, its coefficient is negative. The result of age makes sense though: one year older reduces a person's chances of promotion by 1.53%. Consistent with this result, starting one more year earlier as a city leader increases a person's chances of promotion by 1.34%. However, having provincial experience significantly reduces a person's chances of promotion by 8.90%. Therefore, leaving the provincial government to work in a city is more of an exile than a bridge for further promotion.
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The insignificant result of the leader ranking is troublesome. One possibility is that its effect very much depends on age; a person approaching retirement age is much less likely to get promoted even if he is very capable. Therefore, in regression (2) we interact the ranking with age. Now the coefficient of the leading ranking turns highly significant and positive, and age becomes highly insignificant while their interaction term is significantly negative. The youngest leader was 40 years old in the first year of office. Using the estimates of the ranking and age, we get the result that his probability of promotion increases by 3.04 percentage points if his ranking of ability increases by 10 percentage points. This effect declines at a rate of 0.30
percentage points for every one year added to his age so by age 50 the effect vanishes. The average age of the 612 leaders was 52, and only 36% of them were 50 years old or younger.
Therefore, it seems that personal ability is only a significant factor for a relatively small group of leaders. However, it is the leaders in this group that compete more fiercely with each other.
In the party hierarchy, normally it takes at least five years for a person to move up one level (i.e., from vice mayor to mayor, and from mayor to vice provincial governor). But the central government seldom takes local officials older than 60 years old. This means that to reach the level of the central government, a city-level official has to get to the level of vice provincial governors around the age 50 because there are two more levels to go before he loses his chances at the age 60. The average effect of personal abilities for the city leaders between 40 and 50 years old is 1.5 percentage points for a ten percentage point increase of one's ranking. In our short sample, about 40% of the leaders got promoted. Suppose that they were those ranked in the top 40% in terms of their personal abilities. Then compared with the leaders ranked the lowest 40%, their superior abilities on average increased their chances of promotion by nine percentage points, or close to one fourth of the actual probability of promotion in the sample.
Regression (3) deletes the retirees from the sample and estimate regression (2)'s specification again. There are three significant changes. One is that age turns significantly positive:
one year older increases a person's probability of promotion by 3.03 percentage points. This makes sense though. The probability of promotion increases with age when a leader is young but the effect gets flattened when he gets older. When retirees are excluded, the effect of age is freed up. The second change is that the effect of the leader ranking becomes much smaller. For a leader of age 40, increasing his rank by 10 percentage points will only boost his probability of promotion by 0.7 percentage points and it vanishes quickly in two years. Therefore, deleting the retirees reduces the estimate by forcing us to compare the promoted leaders with a younger group of staying leaders. The third change is that the coefficient of city experience increases to 4.13 percentage points. This result is due to the similar cause responsible for a larger estimate for age: older leaders usually started their career more early than young leaders, but because they did not get promoted, the effect of experience is suppressed in regressions (1) and (2) .
There may be a possibility that the effect of the leader ranking is also confounded by city experience. For example, starting more early may help a person with a lower ability ranking to get promoted simply because he was chosen as a future leader at the very beginning.
Therefore, in regression (4) we also add the interaction term between the leader ranking and city experience, but put the retirees back in the sample (the regressions introduced thereafter all include the retirees). It turns out that both city experience and its interaction term with the leader ranking have become statistically insignificant although both are positive. The effect of the leader ranking has not changed much though.
Lastly, we compare the predicting powers of the estimated leader personal abilities and economic growth for a leader's promotion. This amounts to adding in regression (5) the annual growth rate of per-capita GDP of the city served by a leader. However, its coefficient is highly insignificant while the estimate for the leader ranking has barely changed. To the extent that
personal abilities are what the organizational department looks at in determining promotion, this result is not a surprising finding. It also shows that our identification strategy (and for that matter, the organizational department's strategy of leader shuffling) has been successful so there is no extra information contained in GDP growth.
Concluding Remarks
In this paper we extend the Jones and Olken (2005) test to city leaders from 17 Chinese provinces using a different method. Our test uses more information than Jones and Olken's test because we compare leaders both within the same city and between cities while they only compare leaders in the same country. As a result, our test is less likely than theirs to make the second type of error. We also extend Li and Zhou (2005)'s study on the relationship between leader performance and their promotion in China. Using the estimated ability of a leader as the predictor for his promotion, we obtain finer results than theirs. In particular, we find that the estimated personal ability is a stronger predictor than a city's economic growth, but its effect is sensitive to a leader's age.
In addition to confirming the thesis that leaders matter for economic growth, our study also sheds lights on the promotion tournament in the Chinese political hierarchy. First, we
show both theoretically and empirically that shuffling is a way to find the true abilities of leaders. The purpose of shuffling is not so much about testing leaders in different cities, but to make cities connected so their leaders can be compared across cities. As a result, the number of shuffling does not need to be large (in our connected sample, only 18.6% were shuffled). Second, age is a pivotal factor determining a leader's chances of promotion. Entering the hierarchy at younger ages definitely helps; conversely, an older person's chances diminish quickly even if he is more capable than the average. Third, the competition among leaders has heterogeneous effects on different sectors; more capable leaders put more efforts on the secondary sector because businesses in that sector are more mobile than in the two other sectors. This has implications for China's internal and external imbalance problems. One of distinctive features of the Chinese economy is that the manufacturing sector takes a much larger share in GDP than in other countries. But manufacturing is more capital intensive than services and agriculture, so a larger manufacturing sector contributes to larger domestic savings (Li, 
